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Resort Pricing and Bankruptcy
A. S. Mousa, M. Faias and A. A. Pinto
Abstract We introduce a resort pricing model, where different types of tourists
choose between different resorts. We study the influence of the resort prices on the
choices of the different types of tourists. We characterize the coherent strategies of
the tourists that are Nash equilibria. We find the prices that lead to the bankruptcy of
the resorts and, in particular, their dependence on the characteristics of the tourists.
1 Introduction
The distribution of different types of tourists reaching a destination affects both the
demand and supply side of the tourism industry. From the demand perspective, the
choice of a particular destination will depend greatly on the beliefs of the agent
about which kind of tourists will share the resort with him/her (see [4, 5]). On the
supply side, resorts try to sell their destination based on reputation, and a large factor
that determines the character and reputation of a resort is the type of tourists who
frequent that resort (see [6]). Brida et als. [1, 2] presented a tourism model where the
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choice of a resort by a tourist depends not only on the product offered by the resort,
but also depends on the characteristics of the other tourists present in the resort. In
order to explore the effect the type of resident tourist has on other potential tourists
selecting the same resort, they introduced a game theoretical model and described
some relevant Nash equilibria. We add to the previous models the influence of resort
prices on the tourist’s choice of a resort (see [7]). We characterize the prices that
lead to the bankruptcy of the resorts and, in particular, their dependence on the
characteristics of the tourists.
2 Resort Pricing Model
The resort pricing model has two types T = {t1, t2} of tourists i ∈ I that have to
choose between two goods or services. For instance, the tourists have to choose
between spending their holidays in a beach resort B or in a mountain resort M, i.e.
r ∈ R = {B,M}. Let nq ≥ 1 be the number of tourists with type tq. Let P be the
price vector whose coordinates pr indicates the standard price of the resort r for
each tourist, independently of its type,
P = (pB, pM).
Let L be the preference location matrix whose coordinates ωrq indicate how much
the tourist, with type tq, likes, or dislikes, to choose resort r
L =
(
ωB1 ω
M
1
ωB2 ω
M
2
)
.
The preference location matrix indicates, for each type, the resort that the tourists
prefer, i.e. the tourists taste type (see [1, 2, 3]).
Let Nr be the preference neighbors matrix whose coordinates αrqq′ indicate how
much the tourist, with type tq, likes, or dislikes, that tourist, with type tq′ , chooses
resort r
Nr =
(
αr11 α
r
12
αr21 α
r
22
)
.
The preference neighbors matrix indicates, for each type of tourists, whom they
prefer to be with or to not be with at each resort, i.e. the tourists crowding type (see
[1, 2, 3]).
Let
A =
(
A11 A12
A21 A22
)
be the coordinates of the partial threshold order matrix, where Ai j = αBi j+αMi j , for
i, j ∈ {1,2}. The partial thresholds encode all relevant information for the existence
of Nash equilibria strategies.
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We describe the tourists’ location by a strategy map S : I→ R that associates to
each tourist i ∈ I its location S(i) ∈R. Let S be the space of all strategies S. Given a
strategy S, let OS be the strategic occupation matrix, whose coordinates lrq = l
r
q(S)
indicate the number of tourists, with type tq, that choose resort r
OS =
(
lB1 l
M
1
lB2 l
M
2
)
.
The strategic occupation vector VS, associated to a strategy S, is the vector (l1, l2) =
(lB1 (S), l
B
2 (S)). Hence, l1 (resp. n1− l1) is the number of tourists, with type t1, who
choose the resort B (resp. M). Similarly, l2 (resp. n2− l2) is the number of tourists,
with type t2, that choose the resort B (resp. M). The set O of all possible occupation
vectors is
O = {(l1, l2) : 0≤ l1 ≤ n1 and 0≤ l2 ≤ n2}.
Let U1 : R×O→ R the utility function, of the tourist with type t1, be given by
U1(B; l1, l2) = −pB+ωB1 +αB11(l1−1)+αB12l2
U1(M; l1, l2) = −pM +ωM1 +αM11(n1− l1−1)+αM12(n2− l2).
Let U2 : R×O→ R the utility function, of the tourists with type t2, be given by
U2(B; l1, l2) = −pB+ωB2 +αB22(l2−1)+αB21l1
U2(M; l1, l2) = −pM +ωM2 +αM22(n2− l2−1)+αM21(n1− l1).
Given a strategy S ∈ S, the utility Ui(S), of the tourist i with type tp(i), is given by
Up(i)(S(i); lB1 (S), l
B
2 (S)).
We note that, if the price can depend on the tourist type, then the prices can be
encoded in the preference decision matrix and, therefore, the model can be studied
as the yes-no decision model presented in [8].
Definition 1. A strategy S∗ : I→ R is a Nash equilibrium if, for every tourist i ∈ I
and for every strategy S, with the property that S∗( j) = S( j) for every tourist j ∈
I \{i}, we have
Ui(S∗)≥Ui(S).
A coherent strategy1 is a strategy in which all tourists, with the same type, prefer to
choose the same resort. A coherent strategy is described by a mapC : T→R where,
for every tourist i with type tq(i), C(q(i)) indicates its location. Hence, a coherent
strategyC : T→R determines an unique strategy S : I→R given by S(i) =C(q(i)).
Let x = ωB1 −ωM1 be the horizontal relative location preference of the tourists with
type t1 and let y=ωB2 −ωM2 be the vertical relative location preference of the tourists
with type t2. Let p= pB− pM be the relative price. Given a pair (x,y) of relative lo-
cation preferences, the Nash equilibrium prices interval P(R1,R2) = P(x,y;R1,R2)
of a coherent strategy (R1,R2) is the set of all relative prices p for which the strategy
1 or equivalently, no-split strategy or heard strategy
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(R1,R2) is a Nash equilibrium. Our aim is to determine and characterize all Nash
equilibrium prices interval.
3 Nash Equilibrium Prices
We observe that there are four distinct coherent strategies:
• (B,B) strategy - all tourists choose the resort B;
• (B,M) strategy - all tourists, with type t1, choose the resort B, and all tourists,
with type t2, choose the resort M;
• (M,B) strategy - all tourists, with type t1, choose the resort M and all tourists,
with type t2, choose the resort B;
• (M,M) strategy - all tourists choose the resort M.
The horizontal H(B,B) and vertical V (B,B) strategic thresholds of the (B,B) strat-
egy are given by
H(B,B) =−αB11(n1−1)−αB12n2 and V (B,B) =−αB22(n2−1)−αB21n1.
The (B,B) Nash equilibrium prices interval P(B,B) is the semi-line
P(B,B) = {p ∈ R : p≤ x−H(B,B) and p≤ y−V (B,B)}.
In the red half-plane of the upper left section of Figure 1, for a given relative pref-
erences pair (x,y), the first coordinate of the blue vector, i.e. the yellow horizontal
projection, represents the maximum price in P(B,B); in the green half-plane, for a
given relative preferences pair (x,y), the second coordinate of the blue vector, i.e.
the orange vertical projection, represents the maximum price in P(B,B).
The horizontal H(B,M) and verticalV (B,M) strategic thresholds of the (B,M) strat-
egy are given by
H(B,M) =−αB11(n1−1)+αM12n2 and V (B,M) = αM22(n2−1)−αB21n1.
The (B,M) Nash equilibrium prices interval P(B,M) is the segment line (that can be
empty)
P(B,M) = {p ∈ R : p≤ x−H(B,M) and p≥ y−V (B,M)}.
In the blue half-plane of the upper right section of Figure 1, for a given relative pref-
erences pair (x,y), the second coordinate of the blue vector, i.e. the orange vertical
projection, represents the minimum price in P(B,M) and the first coordinate of the
blue vector, i.e. the yellow horizontal projection, represents the maximum price in
P(B,M); in the purple half-plane, there are no Nash equilibrium prices.
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The horizontal H(M,B) and verticalV (M,B) strategic thresholds of the (M,B) strat-
egy are given by
H(M,B) = αM11(n1−1)−αB12n2 and V (M,B) =−αB22(n2−1)+αM21n1.
The (M,B) Nash equilibrium prices interval P(M,B) is the segment line (that can be
empty)
P(M,B) = {p ∈ R : p≥ x−H(M,B) and p≤ y−V (M,B)}.
In the blue half-plane of the lower left section of Figure 1, for a given relative pref-
erences pair (x,y), the first coordinate of the blue vector, i.e. the yellow horizontal
projection, represents the minimum price in P(M,B) and the second coordinate of
the blue vector, i.e. the orange vertical projection, represents the maximum price in
P(M,B); in the purple half-plane, there are no Nash equilibrium prices.
The horizontal H(M,M) and vertical V (M,M) strategic thresholds of the (M,M)
strategy are given by
H(M,M) = αM11(n1−1)+αM12n2 and V (M,M) = αM22(n2−1)+αM21n1.
The (M,M) Nash equilibrium prices interval P(M,M) is the semi-line
P(M,M) = {p ∈ R : p≥ x−H(M,M) and p≥ y−V (M,M)}.
In the red half-plane of the lower right section of Figure 1, for a given relative pref-
erences pair (x,y), the first coordinate of the blue vector, i.e. the yellow horizontal
projection, represents the minimum price in P(M,M); in the green half-plane of the
lower right section of Figure 1, for a given relative preferences pair (x,y) the sec-
ond coordinate of the blue vector, i.e. the orange vertical projection, represents the
minimum price in P(M,M).
4 Bankruptcy Nash Equilibrium Prices
Let the coherent uniqueness Nash equilibria prices be the regions U(B,B) ⊂
P(B,B), U(B,M) ⊂ P(B,M), U(M,B) ⊂ P(M,B) and U(M,M) ⊂ P(M,M), where
for every point in these regions, there is a unique coherent Nash equilibrium. We call
the prices inU(B,B) the bankruptcy Nash equilibrium prices of the mountain resort
M, because, for every price in U(B,B), there are no tourists choosing the mountain
resort M. Similarly, we call the prices in U(M,M) the bankruptcy Nash equilib-
rium prices of the beach resort B, because, for every price in U(M,M) there are no
tourists choosing the beach resort B. We call the prices in U(B,M) and U(M,B) the
competitive business Nash equilibrium prices, because, for every price in U(B,M)
and in U(M,B), one type of tourists choose the beach resort B and the other type of
tourists choose the mountain resort M. We note that, the bankruptcy Nash equilib-
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Fig. 1 Nash equilibrium prices
ria prices U(B,B) and U(M,M) are non-empty, but the competitive business Nash
equilibrium price can be empty (see Figure 2).
m(B,B) x-H(B,M) M(M,M)
P(M,M)P(B,M) P(M,B)P(B,B)
P
y-V(B,M) x-H(M,B) y-V(M,B) m(B,B)x-H(B,M)
P(M,M)
P(B,B)
P
y-V(B,M) x-H(M,B)y-V(M,B)M(M,M)
Fig. 2 Bankruptcy and competitive business Nash equilibria prices, where M(M,M) = max{x−
H(M,M), y−V (M,M)} and m(B,B) = min{x−H(B,B), y−V (B,B)}.
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5 Conclusions
Small changes in the the coordinates of the preference location matrix, which in-
dicates the resort that the tourists prefer, and of the preference neighbors matrix,
which indicates who the tourists prefer to be with in each resort, can create and
annihilate competitive business Nash equilibrium prices and change the bankruptcy
Nash equilibria prices.
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